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A person's ability to accurately judge the frequency of occurrence 
of events has been cited as an example of an "automatic process" (Hasher 
& Zacks, 1979). As an automatic process, the estimation of event fre-
quency is expected to be resilient to a host of experimental manipula-
tions. 
Automatic processes are carried out without an individual being 
aware of their operation (Posner & Snyder, 1975), without intention of 
doing so, and with little effort. Automatic processes are distinguished 
from "effortful" processes in that the former appear to be completely 
developed at an early age, thus showing no developmental changes (Hasher 
& Chromiak, 1977; Hasher & Zacks, 1979). Automatic processes are also 
unaffected by prior instructional set (Howell, 1973; Flexser & Bower, 
1975), do not require aPtentional effort, and do not improve with prac-
tice (Hasher & Chromiak, 1977). In addition, recent studies suggest 
that there is very little variability between individuals in their 
automatic processing abilities (Hasher & Zacks, 1984). 
Despite this evidence that processing of event frequency exhibits 
the above characteristics, the automatic nature of frequency encoding 
has recently been questioned. According to earlier work by Hasher and 
Zacks (1979), once stimuli were attended to, certain attributes such as 
1 
2 
frequency were encoded without additional processing. These researchers 
argued that frequency encoding is insensitive to strategy manipulations. 
Hm.,rever, Fisk and Schneider (1974) have provided results that tend to 
disconfirm this proposition. They required groups of subjects to pro-
cess different attributes of the presented stimuli. For example, sub-
jects were either directed to attend to (a) the graphic characteristics 
of words (does the letter "G" appear in this word?), or to (b) semantic 
characteristics of the words (does the word represent a vehicle?). Fisk 
and Schneider found differences in the accuracy of judgments between 
groups who processed the words under different orienting conditions. 
These results are similar to those found by Rowe (1974) and Rose and 
Rowe (1976), who showed that subjects judged frequency more accurately 
if they performed a semantic encoding of words rather than an ortho-
graphic encoding. 
Other researchers argue that frequency information is simply not 
encoded automatically. For example, Greene (1984) found differences in 
the accuracy of judgments between groups who learned words incidentally 
or intentionally. Greene (1984, Exp.1) compared frequency judgments of 
subjects who were either not told that they would be tested on the word 
lists (incidental learning group), or told that they would be tested on 
their "memory for the words" (intentional learning group). Both groups 
were then tested for their memory of the frequency that the words were 
presented. Greene found a significant difference between the groups in 
the accuracy of their judgments of frequency. Greene argued that this 
result is inconsistent with the claim that frequency information is not 
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affected by the intentionality of learning. Contrary to Hasher and 
Zack's (1979) proposition, the additional processing provided by 
increased attentional effort appears to enhance the accuracy of fre-
quency judgments. 
Given this conflicting evidence on the nature of the frequency 
encoding process, future investigation should be oriented towards 
revealing the circumstances and stimulus conditions under which fre-
quency information is processed automatically. For example, under what 
conditions is frequency judgment accuracy affected by the intent to 
learn the items being judged ? 
The present research is a first step towards investigating con-
flicting theoretical perspectives, such as those held by Hasher and 
Zacks and by Greene. In addition, this research incorporates popular 
music as a stimulus event. The use of such stimuli extends investiga-
tion beyond the typical use of words and word lists to a novel set of 
events. 
Music is a salient part of many person's lives. People listen to 
the radio in their cars and hear music in stores. Some individuals pur-
sue music more intently by buying records or playing an instrument. 
Musical selections are a natural set of events since music is encoun-
tered so often in daily living and under such a variety of conditions 
and environments. The present experiment uses music to examine the 
validity of automatic processing theories of frequency estimation by 
incorporating a new and perhaps richer set of stimulus events. 
Music also represents a more complex set of stimuli than words. 
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In addition to possible verbal associations such as lyrics, music 
includes many other characteristics such as melody, rhythm, and tonal-
ity. This "package" of characteristics that makes up music is the stim-
ulus in question. The validity of automatic processing theories may be 
extended by using more complex and natural stimuli such as music. Using 
popular music as stimuli, the present experiment was designed to assess 
the effects of instructional set, stimulus familiarity, and stimulus 
knowledge on frequency judgment accuracy. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Frequency Encoding: An 
Automatic Process 
Many investigators suggest that one of the most remarkable aspects 
of the human memory is its ability to keep track of how often events 
have occurred. Research has shown that people make relatively accurate 
judgments as to the actual frequency of occurrence of events: as true 
event frequency increases, estimated event frequency also increases 
(Zechmeister & Nyberg, 1982). 
An important distinction is made between judgments of background 
frequency and judgments of situational frequency. "Background" fre-
quency refers to the accumulated frequency of a lifetime of experiences 
whereas "situational" frequency refers to the number of times an event 
has been experienced in a particular situation (Zechmeister & Nyberg, 
1982). Studies have investigated memory for both background and situ-
ational frequency, and have incorporated a variety of stimulus materi-
als. For example, Attneave (1953) found a high correlation ( r =.88) 
between the actual frequency of occurrence of individual letters in the 
English language and subject's estimates of those background frequen-
cies. Similar studies have investigated frequencies of letter combina-
tions (Underwood, 1971) as well as whole word usage in the English lan-
5 
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guage (Howes, 1954; Shapiro, 1969) and have found that as true 
background frequency increased, estimated frequency also increased. 
Studies investigating situational frequency judgments include 
judging the presentation frequency of words within a list (Hintzman, 
1969; Hasher & Chromiak, 1977), words within sentences (Jacoby, 1972), 
whole sentences and their meanings (Gude & Zechmeister, 1975), as well 
as pictures (Hintzman & Rogers, 1973). Subjects in these experiments 
are able to give accurate frequency judgments of the number of times 
they have experienced a particular stimulus event in a situational set-
ting. 
Investigators have placed the capacity of persons to accurately 
judge event frequency under the domain of what Posner and Snyder (1975) 
call "automatic processes." Alternatively, this process has been called 
"obligatory" (Hintzman, Nozawa, & Irmscher, 1982; Hintzman & Stern, 
1978). Automatic processes are distinguished from "effortful" processes 
in that the former appear to be developed at an early age (Hasher & 
Chromiak, 1977; Hasher & Zacks, 1979), are not affected by prior 
instructional set (Howell, 1973; Flexser & Bower, 1975), do not reqiure 
attentional effort, and do not improve with practice (Hasher & Chromiak, 
1977). While prior knowledge, educational .level, intelligence, and 
motivation typically play substantial roles in determining learning, 
researchers have found that these factors do not affect the ability to 
judge frequency (Zacks, Hasher, & Sanft, 1982). For example, Zacks et 
al.(1982) compared frequency judgments of groups of students from two 
universities whose SAT scores differed substantially. No differences 
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were found between the student groups' ability to judge frequency 
accurately. If SAT scores are accepted as a valid measure of intelli-
gence, then frequency judgment accuracy appears to be unaffected by 
intelligence. Differences among individuals seem to be far less impor-
tant for the processing of frequency information than for other cogni-
tive skills (Hasher & Zacks, 1984). The results of many studies investi-
gating frequency encoding and processing domains suggest that keeping 
track of event frequency is an automatic process. 
Although frequency judgments appear automatic, our capacity to 
encode frequency information is not entirely flawless. In some situ-
ations, people make systematic errors when judging frequency of events. 
One bias in frequency estimation can result as a function of the nature 
of the stimulus material. For example, Galbraith and Underwood (1973) 
found that abstract words (such as "infinity" or "justice") are typi-
cally judged to have higher background frequencies than concrete words 
(such as "car" or "dog"), although their actual frequency of occurrence 
may be equivalent. Rose and Rowe (1977) and Malmi (1977) have shown how 
biases can arise as a result of an item's presentation context. For 
example, Malmi found that frequency judgments for words were different 
when the critical (to-be- judged) items were preceded by high-frequency 
versus low-frequency contexts. 
A salient bias in frequency estimation results from what Tversky 
and Kahneman (1973) refer to as an "availability heuristic." Such a fre-
quency estimation strategy relies on the ease with which relevant 
instances of an item/event come to mind. In a classic experiment, Tver-
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sky and Kahneman (1973) demonstrated the effect of an availability 
heuristic. Subjects were presented with either a list containing the 
names of 19 famous women and 20 less famous men, or a list containing 
the names of 19 famous men and 20 less famous women. After the lists 
were presented, subjects were asked to recall the personalities' names 
or to judge whether more male or female names had been presented. Sub-
jects consistently recalled more famous than non-famous names, and erro-
neously judged the class consisting of the more famous names to be more 
frequent. Tversky and Kahneman suggest that because the well-known 
names were more "available", they led subjects to make wrong decisions 
about the true presentation frequency. 
The availability heuristic has also been used to explain another 
frequency judgment bias termed "over-underestimation." For example, 
Lichtenstein, Slavic, Fischhoff, Layman, and Combs (1978) found that the 
actual frequencies of various lethal events (such as death by electrocu-
tion) were typically overestimated by subjects when the events had rela-
tively small true frequencies, and were underestimated when the events 
had large actual frequencies. Such a bias is often present when judg-
ments are required over a wide range of frequencies. 
One explanation for these results is that easily recallable, 
~idely publicized deaths (such as tornado deaths) are more available in 
memory and hence judged as occurring more frequently. Deaths from less 
publicized causes (such as asthma) are typically harder to recall and 
are judged to occur less frequently. Findings from studies such as 
these suggest that while people have a remarkable ability to keep track 
of event frequency, this ability is not infallible. 
Studies Challenging a Theory 
of Automatic Processing 
9 
Despite research apparently validating the automatic nature of 
frequency encoding, several recent studies suggest contrary themes. One 
such study is that by Greene (1984) and concerns the set of criteria 
proposed by Hasher and Zacks (1979) for determining whether frequency 
information is encoded automatically. Greene's experiments are con-
cerned with one of those criteria, namely, intentionality or instruc-
tional set. According to Hasher and Zacks, intentionality of learning, 
or instructional set, should have no effect on accuracy in a frequency 
estimation test. These researchers cite several earlier experiments 
supportive of this assertion. 
Greene offers an alternative interpretation of previous research 
that has shown no effect of instructional set (Flexser & Bower, 197 5; 
Howell, 1973; Zacks, 1982). As Greene states, 
it is possible that people do not know any effective way to keep 
track of the frequencies of a very large number of items. Warning 
them that they will be tested on frequency would therefore do them 
no good. It is quite possible that, if they were told an effective 
strategy to follow, their performance would improve (see Zacks et 
al., 1982, Experiment 2). Alternatively, even subjects who are 
expecting only an unspecified "memory test" on the items might adopt 
a mnemonic strategy that involves keeping track of the frequency of 
the items. (Greene, 1984, p.90) 
Greene (1984) and other investigators (Lehman, 1982; ~1ander, Seeg-
miller, & Day, 1977) have proposed that the definitive test for deter-
mining automatic processing of an attribute of an item 
is between incidental and intentional learning of the items them-
selves, as opposed to varying the intent to learn that specific 
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attribute. The crucial comparison is between one group of subjects 
who know that they will be tested on the presentation frequency of 
the items, and a second group who does not expect such a frequency 
test. (Greene, 1984, p. 90) 
The group not expecting a frequency test, the incidental learning group, 
should have no reason to encode particular attributes of the stimulus. 
Subjects in this group are not expected to use mnemonic strategies of 
any type, including strategies based on frequency information. 
Experiment 1 of Greene's (1984) research compared frequency judg-
ments of two groups. Subjects were either not told that they would be 
tested on ~wrd lists (incidental learning group) or that their "memory 
for the ~vords" would be tested (intentional learning group). The proce-
dure involved a modified Brown-Peterson short-term memory task. Both 
groups were presented with a series of 96 trials in which a microproces-
sor displayed a row of five digits. A word was then displayed on a sub-
sequent screen. The subjects in the incidental learning group were told 
that they were participating in an experiment on short-term memory for 
digits, and that they would be required to repeat the words aloud as a 
distracting activity between presentation and recall of the digits. 
These subjects were not told that a test on the words would follow the 
trials. Subjects in the intentional learning group were told that their 
memory for the words would be tested following the trials. Both groups 
were then tested on the presentation frequency of the ·words. Experiment 
2 was similar, but included a third group of subjects who were told that 
they would be tested on how often each word occurred (frequency learning 
group). 
Regarding the accuracy of frequency judgments in Experiment 1, 
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Greene found that subjects in the intentional learning group were sig-
nificantly more accurate in their judgment of frequency than subjects in 
the incidental learning group. A straightforward theory of automatic 
processing of frequency information suggests that both groups should 
show comparable levels of accuracy of frequency estimation. However, in 
Greene's experiments, subjects who were exposed to the critical words 
without anticipating a frequency test apparently did not encode the 
words in the same manner as the intentional learning group. Greene 
argues that this processing difference does not support a theory of 
automatic frequency encoding, since accuracy was dependent upon the ori-
enting instructions given to the subjects. Thus Greene's results seem 
inconsistent with the claim that frequency information is unaffected by 
the intentionality of learning. 
Regarding Experiment 2, the mean accuracy of frequency judgments 
was equivalent in intentional-learning and frequency-learning groups, 
and both were more accurate than the incidental-learning group. There-
fore, a significant overall effect of instructional set was found. 
Greene concluded that the intentionality of learning improves frequency 
estimation performance. 
In another recent study of frequency judgments, Fisk and Schneider 
(1984) presented results which also disconfirm Hasher and Zacks' (1979) 
"automatic encoding" proposal regarding the processing of frequency 
information. In Experiment 1 of Fisk and Schneider's (1984) research, 
subjects were assigned to groups to perform tasks requiring varying lev-
els of information processing. Subjects in five groups were presented 
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with a series of microprocessor displays containing one word and two 
digits each. Each of these five groups was presented with identical 
display trials, but required to perform different operations on the 
words and digits. The tasks for each of the five groups respectively, 
included: a) an intentional learning task in which subjects were told 
about the subsequent frequency estimation task and were required to push 
a response button when they detected a word representing the name of a 
vehicle; b) a semantic orienting task in which subjects were not told 
about the frequency estimation task, but were simply instructed to 
respond whenever they detected a word representing the name of a vehi-
cle; c) a graphic orienting task in which subjects were required to 
respond to any word containing the letter "G"; d) a "look" task in which 
subjects were required to search for one of two digits in displays con-
taining two digits and to look at words presented in the fovea (subjects 
were told that the experiment was designed to "see how much could be 
remembered when something more important was happening", and they were 
informed that the most important task was the digit-detection task); and 
e) an "ignore" task in which subjects performed the digit-detection task 
and were told to ignore the words because they were inserted to distract 
them from the digit-detection task. Following the presentation trials, 
all subjects were given a frequency estimation task in which they were 
required to make their best estimate of the number of times they had 
seen each word. 
Regarding frequency estimation accuracy, the results showed that 
subjects who intentionally processed the words (i.e., intentional, 
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semantic, and graphic conditions) were able to estimate word frequency 
accurately, whereas subjects in the other conditions were not. Such 
"intentionality" involves the controlled processing of specific word 
attributes which results in a deeper elaboration of the meaning and 
characteristics of the word itself. Again, a straightforward theory of 
automatic processing of frequency information suggests that all five 
groups should show comparable levels of accuracy of frequency estima-
tion. As in Greene's (1984) experiments, however, Fisk and Schnieder 
found that groups who intentionally processed the words apparently 
encoded the information differently than the other groups who processed 
the words "superficially." The between-group differences found by Fisk 
and Schneider seem contrary to Hasher and Zack's (1979) proposal regard-
ing the automatic processing of frequency estimation. Such results are, 
on the other hand, consistent with the results found by Rose and Rowe 
(1976) and Rowe (1974). In these studies, semantic (incidental) pro-
cessing tasks produced better subsequent frequency estimation than did 
orthographic processing tasks. 
Critical Issues in the Current 
Controversy 
The results of these studies suggest that the encoding of fre-
quency information may not be wholly as "automatic" as prior research 
has suggested. A critical issue in this controversy regards the orient-
ing instructions given to subjects. Hasher and Zack's theory of auto-
matic processing of frequency information suggests that differential 
instructions should have no effect on frequency judgment accuracy. How-
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ever, as is evident, results of recent studies show effects for 
instructional set. A theory of automatic processing suggests that if a 
process is indeed automatic, then it should be resilient to attempts to 
control that process. However, Greene ( 1984) and Fisk and Schneider 
(1984) have shown that the processing of frequency information can be 
inhibited or facilitated depending on the task performed on the critical 
stimulus. If indeed frequency encoding can be facilitated by semantic 
tasks, for example, would a greater degree of knowledge about the criti-
cal stimuli (thus enhancing semantic processing) further affect the pro-
cessing of frequency information ? 
The ability to control the processing of frequency information 
also raises the issue of individual differences in processing ability. 
A theory of automatic processing of frequency information suggests that, 
since an automatic cognitive operation is not readily under one's con-
trol, there should be less variability between persons in their ability 
to encode frequency information than there should be to encode attri-
butes which are not processed automatically (such as reading comprehen-
sion). Studies by Zacks et al. (1982) and Goldstein, Kosteski, and 
Hasher (in press) appear to validite such a claim. However, if accuracy 
of frequency encoding can be enhanced through semantic tasks, and if 
some persons have a greater semantic facility (through greater knowledge 
of a particular event class) than others, then perhaps variability among 
individuals is to be expected. Moreover, this may be particularly evi-
dent for sets of stimuli with which persons are found to differ in pro-
cessing competency. That is, it is likely that persons' existing level 
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of knowledge or familiarity with a stimulus set affects their ability to 
judge frequency accurately. 
This reasoning suggests that people who are familiar with, or 
expert, regarding a given class of stimuli might be better able to pro-
cess information meaningfully or semantically, thus enhancing the accur-
acy of their frequency judgments. This idea is a logical extension of 
Greene's, and of Fisk and Schneider's suggestion that meaningful pro-
cessing can affect the accuracy of frequency judgments. Persons who are 
more familiar with a class of events could perhaps perform more meaning-
ful processing. The issue becomes one of prior stimulus knowledge. Can 
prior knowledge affect frequency judgment accuracy ? The present exper-
iment involves: a) a further investigation of the automatic versus non-
automatic dilemma by examining the effects of instructional set and 
knowledge on the accuracy of frequency judgments, and b) the validation 
or invalidation of a theory of automatic processing of frequency infer-
mation incorporating a currently unstudied stimulus in which familiarity 
is readily manipulable, viz., songs. 
Musical Selections as an Event 
Stimulus 
Research investigating memory for event frequency has generally 
examined retention of verbal stimuli such as words (Hintzman, 1969), 
parts of words (Underwood, 1971), or pictures (Hintzman & Rogers, 1973). 
However, Hasher and Chromiak (1977) have suggested that automatic encod-
ing of frequency information potentially extends to all stimuli, whether 
the stimuli are meaningful or not. The present research tests the gen-
16 
erality of Hasher and Chromiak's proposition by using musical stimuli. 
\~hile instrumental music (as opposed to vocal music) is clearly 
not a meaningless stimuli, it could be considered more abstract than 
verbal stimuli. Despite the abstract nature of instrumental music, com-
pared to the more concrete class of verbal stimuli, recent research sug-
gests that common Western (twelve-tone) musical structures reflect the 
general rules of cognitive organization (Deutsch & Ferae, 1981). Per-
haps the critical distinction between music and words lies in their dif-
fering levels of complexity and abstractness. 
The majority of research on the cognitive processing of music has 
been molecular in nature (i.e., musical structures are subdivided into 
their constituent parts, as opposed to taking a musical selection as a 
unified stimulus). For example, Sturges and Martin (1974) examined ease 
of recognition of eight-element "buzz tone" rhythms. Jeffries (1974) 
investigated the frequency with which musical intervals (tone separa-
tion) occurs in music, along with the relative familiarity of ascending 
versus descending intervals. Krumhansl (1979) studied the psychological 
representation of musical pitch in a tonal context with respect to a 
major triad (i.e., the psychological relationship of a single tone to a 
group of three tones, or a chord). Krumhansl and Kessler (1982) inves-
tigated perceived tonal organization in spatial representations of musi-
cal keys. This research suggests that music perception not only depends 
on the psychoacoustic properties of tones, but also on the processes 
which relate tones to other tones. In addition, these studies exhibit a 
primary concern for the elements of musical structure, rather than for 
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musical structure considered as a whole. 
While the majority of studies investigating the cognitive process-
ing of music deal respectively with rhythms, pitch, intervals, and their 
relationships, several researchers have considered the musical piece as 
a unit. For example, Halpern (1984) studied differences between musi-
cians and non-musicians in their processing of "realistic" music. Sub-
jects in Halpern's experiment were required to listen to unfamiliar 
musical selections in order to study the perception of novel music 
structure. Results from this experiment included the finding that musi-
cians apparently exceed non-musicians in the ability to categorize music 
in multiple ways. However, even non-musicians extract considerable 
information from newly heard music. 
Other research investigating the cognitive processing of music 
includes a study by Stewart and Wilbanks (1982) who used musical selec-
tions to test a temporal ordering effect of recognition time (i.e., is a 
musical phrase better recognized if it is from the beginning, middle, or 
end of a musical piece?). Stewart and Wilbank's study used unfamiliar 
songs by Debussy as stimuli. Their results indicated that whether a 
musical phrase is at the beginning, middle, or end of a composition does 
not in itself determine recognition time. Welker (1982) examined the 
abstraction of musical themes from melodic variations of songs, and 
found that subjects were accurate in their ability to abstract a theme 
(prototype) from sets of melodic variations in both false recognition 
task paradigms, and drawing tasks of the melodic contour. 
While many aspects of the cognitive processing of music have been 
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investigated, few have specifically dealt with memory for music. A 
notable exception is research conducted by Dowling (1978) who delineates 
two components of a theory of memory for melodies: scale and contour. 
In this theory, music is encoded in memory as a pattern of "ups and 
downs" (contour) which is applied to an overlearned structure of tones 
(the twelve-tone Western scale). 
As suggested above, perhaps the critical distinction between music 
and words lies in their differing levels of complexity and abstractness. 
In terms of complexity, words have a graphic character, a semantic com-
ponent, a grammatical component, and an auditory component, whereas 
music contains tonality (both absolute and relative), rhythm, tempo, 
melody, harmony, instrumentation, and perhaps an emotional and prefer-
ence component exceeding that of individual words. In addition, many 
popular musical pieces contain words in their composition. While words 
and music are clearly not directly classifiable along similar dimen-
sions, a fundamental difference in complexity seems evident. 
In terms of abstractness, words have a generally unambiguous rela-
tionship to meaning, even though some words may have multiple meanings 
(such as the word "lie"). Music has a character which is less referent, 
in that a tone or melody does not always represent concepts, objects, or 
actions. If music is considered to be less strongly tied to meaning 
than individual words, then it seems reasonable to deem music as being 
more abstract than words. Again, while words and music are not directly 
classifiable along similar dimensions, both appear to differ in funda-
mental levels of abstractness. The present experiment not only investi-
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gates further the validity of frequency encoding theories, but 
supplements research conducted on memory for music as well. 
Overview of the Present 
Experiment 
The present experiment required subjects to estimate the frequency 
of occurrence of musical excerpts. The use of musical selections for 
investigating frequency estimation is important in that the stimuli rep-
resent a more abstract and richer set of events than those previously 
investigated. Moreover, this study investigates further the issue high-
lighted by Greene's (1984) experiments: namely, intentional and inciden-
tal learning conditions. Greene suggested that the critical test of the 
automaticity of frequency encoding relies on the differences found 
between intentional and incidental learning groups, and stated that his 
results showed "no strong evidence for the automatic encoding of fre-
quency information" (p.90). 
The present experiment will also provide a test of a "knowledge 
effect" for frequency encoding. Pilot data gathered on this issue using 
musical stimuli suggest that knowledge of the stimulus material may 
indeed affect persons' ability to accurately encode frequency informa-
tion. The results of a pilot study indicated that subjects who were 
better able to identify the titles and performers of the songs used as 
stimuli (thus reflecting a greater degree of music knowledge) were more 
accurate in their frequency judgments than subjects who were poor at 
song title and artist identification. 
The present experiment included six groups. The effect of knowl-
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edge on frequency judgment accuracy was measured by requiring half of 
the qroups to estimate the presentation frequency of popular, often-
heard songs, and requiring the other half of the groups to estimate the 
presentation frequency of "popular sounding" but unfamiliar songs. In 
this experiment "knowledge" of the songs was defined as the familiarity 
that subjects have with these songs. The group of "low familiarity 
songs" contained songs for which subjects typically cannot identify the 
title or performer, and which subjects report having heard "rarely or 
never." "High familiarity songs" were readily identified in terms of 
title and artist, and were reported as being heard "often or very 
often." Norms were collected on these songs in terms of familiarity. 
The procedure for collecting these norms is discussed in a subsequent 
section. 
~ithin the high and low familiarity conditions, subjects were sep-
arated into three subgroups. Subjects were either aware of an upcoming 
frequency test, aware of an unspecified memory test, or not told memory 
would be tested and performed a distractor task of completing a math 
aptitude test. The third group represents a replication of Greene's 
(1984, Exp. 1) "incidental learning" condition. The resultant 2 X 3 
design provides a test of a knowledge effect for frequency estimation, 
as well as a test for the effect of incidental versus intentional learn-
ing on frequency judgment accuracy. Heasures of frequency judgments 
were based on estimates that subjects gave for the number of times each 
song had been presented to them on an audio tape. 
While a theory of automatic processing of frequency information 
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suggests that no differences should be found between groups, data from 
the pilot experiment suggest that: a) subjects in each of the three 
"high familiarity" groups should perform better than those in each of 
the three respective "low familiarity" groups, b) subjects in inten-
tional learning groups should be more accurate in judging frequency than 
subjects in incidental learning groups, and c) there should be no dif-
ferences in accuracy of frequency judgments between subjects who are 
aware of an upcoming, unspecified memory test and subjects aware of an 
upcoming frequency test. This final point is the only issue of agree-
ment between an automatic processing theory of frequency information and 
recent data challenging that theory. 
Pilot Experiments 
A series of three pilot experiments were conducted in which a 
total of 121 subjects participated. Two pilot experiments (including 26 
and 32 subjects, respectively) compared frequency judgments of groups 
who were aware of an unspecified, upcoming memory test, and groups who 
were aware of an upcoming frequency test. A third pilot experiment 
(involving 63 subjects) included the same groups as above, in addition 
to a third "distractor" group who performed a reading comprehension test 
and were told to ignore the tapes being played in the background. 
Because the procedures and results were· similar in ·each of the ·three 
pilot trials, these experiments will be discussed concurrently. Differ-
ences between experiments will be noted where relevant. 
In all pilot experiments, subjects were presented with an audio 
tape containing 10-second excerpts from 21 popular songs. Of these 
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songs, four were presented once, four were presented twice, four were 
presented three times, and four were presented four times. Five songs 
were used as "buffers" and were not judged. All songs and their pos i-
tions in the tape sequence were block-randomized so that no song was 
repeated within three positions. 
After this tape was played a "test tape" was presented to the sub-
jects in which each of the 16 critical items was played once, along with 
four songs that were not presented in the first tape (zero-presented 
items). Subjects were then asked to provide frequency judgments for 
each of the 20 songs in the test tape. 
Two groups of subjects heard both tapes. One group was told that 
frequency judgments would be required following the tape presentation, 
but the other group was unaware that frequency judgments would follow. 
The results of the pilot studies correspond with prior research in that 
there were no significant differences between the group's ability to 
judge frequency. Knowledge of a forthcoming frequency judgment task did 
not improve a person's ability to estimate frequency accurately. How-
ever, subjects in the third experiment's "distractor" condition were 
significantly less accurate in their frequency estimation than were the 
other two groups (frequency test and memory test groups). 
In addition to providing frequency estimates of the critical 
songs, subjects were also required to identify the song's title and per-
former (group or artist), if they could do so. For each subject, the 
number of correct title identifications and correct performer identifi-
cations correlated highly ( r =. 89), so that only one measure, title, 
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was used in the analysis. 
The results showed that subjects who knew the titles of more songs 
were more accurate in their frequency judgments. These results appear 
to contradict the automatic processing theory of frequency judgment 
accuracy on two counts: a) knowledge of the stimulus material apparently 
influenced frequency judgment accuracy, and b) subjects were apparently 
less accurate in frequency estimation when required to perform other 
"distractor" tasks. Considering these results along with those of 
Greene (1984) and Fisk and Schneider (1984), an experiment was designed 
to assess both a "knowledge effect" as well as a "condition effect" 





In order to investigate the effect of high versus low knowledge of 
stimulus material on the accuracy of frequency judgments, it was neces-
sary to construct tapes for groups reflecting this knowledge difference. 
The tape edited for the high knowledge conditions consisted of well-
knmm, familiar music (such as Hichael Jackson's "Thriller"), and the 
tape edited for the low knowledge conditions consisted of familiar 
sounding, but unknown music (such as Aldo Nova's "Under the Gun"). 
Before constructing the above tapes, norms were gathered on the true 
popularity of each critical song used. Such a strategy is analogous to 
the use of background word frequency lists compiled by Thorndike and 
Lorge (1944). 
In this experiment, knowledge of popular musical selections was 
defined as the frequency with which such selections have been heard, as 
well as the number of correct song title and performer identifications 
for each selection. A 14-minute tape recording was edited for the pur-
pose of gathering norms on the familiarity of the chosen songs. The 
tape consisted of 44, 10-second excerpts from the beginnings of musical 
pieces. The experimenter chose 22 popular songs from recent radio and 
music industry surveys. Therefore, "well-known" songs were in the "top 
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40" at some point in their history. Such songs typically receive wide 
exposure on contemporary radio stations. The experimenter also chose 22 
rarely heard songs to be included in the tape. Such songs sounded simi-
lar to the "well-known" songs, as they evidenced similar rhythm struc-
ture, tonality, instrumentation, and musical style. Song excerpts from 
both familiarity categories were randomized and recorded with 5- to 
7-second silent intervals between selections. 
The tape was played to 46 students at Loyola University of Chicago 
who were enrolled in undergraduate psychology courses. Subjects were 
asked to provide song titles, song performer, and a rating from 1 to 7 
(7 being most familiar) of the familiarity of each song that was played. 
The results from the pilot survey verified the experimenter 1 s 
judgments of the familiarity and unfamiliarity of the chosen songs, 
respectively. The mean familiarity rating of the "well-known" songs (on 
a 1 to 7 scale) was 5.18, compared to a familiarity rating of 1.53 for 
"unknmm" songs, t (38)=18.44, p <.001. In addition, the well-known 
songs were identified correctly about half the time, on the average. 
Only two correct identifications (less than 1 percent) were made of the 
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unfamiliar songs, X (1)=1159.02, p <.0001. From the 22 songs in each 
familiarity category, two were eliminated since only 20 critical items 
would be used for the final tapes. The 20 songs used in each familiar-
ity condition, their mean familiarity ratings and total identification 
scores are presented in Appendix A. 
Having identified the songs to be used in the high familiarity and 
low familiarity conditions, tapes were edited using a procedure identi-
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cal to that of the pilot experiment. That is, a "presentation tape" 
containing the randomly selected critical items plus buffer items was 
followed by a "test tape", in which the critical items were played once, 
along with four new items never before presented. Each song excerpt was 
about 10-seconds in length, with about 7-second silent intervals between 
selections. 
Four final tapes were edited; two alternate forms of the familiar, 
high-kno....,ledge song tape, and two alternate forms of the unfamiliar, 
low-knowledge song tape. Song tapes constructed for each familiarity 
condition consisted of two blocks each. Overall, each tape consisted of 
16 critical, or to-be-judged items. Eight of these items were presented 
in block A, and eight were presented in block B. The two forms of the 
familiar song tape consisted of block A followed by block B, and block B 
follo\\'ed by block A, respectively. The two forms of the unfamiliar song 
tape followed a similar format. The alternate forms of each tape were 
used to control for any order effect that might possibly be present in 
terms of song sequence. 
Equipment 
Audio tapes were edited using an Onkyo 2070 stereo cassette deck, 
and a Philips AF 777 turntable. Tapes were presented to subjects using a 
portable Panasonic cassette player. 
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Design 
This experiment included six experimental conditions. The effect 
of knowledge on the accuracy of frequency judgments was measured by 
requiring subjects in the three high-familiarity conditions to estimate 
the presentation frequency of popular, often heard songs, and requiring 
subjects in the three low-familiarity conditions to estimate the presen-
tation frequency of "popular sounding" but unfamiliar songs. Within the 
above high and low familiarity conditions, subjects were divided into 
three sub-groups. Subjects were either aware of an upcoming frequency 
test ("frequency" condition), aware of an upcoming unspecified memory 
test ("memory test" condition), or not told memory would be tested and 
required to perform a distractor task involving a math skills test 
("distractor" condition). The resultant 2 X 3 design provides a test of 
a familiarity effect for frequency judgments as well as a test for an 
effect of incidental versus intentional learning on frequency judgment 
accuracy. 
Procedure 
Subjects were first given instructions about the task, then pre-
sented with a 23-minute tape recording containing 52, 10-second musical 
excerpts. After this "presentation tape" was played, subjects listened 
to a 13-minute · "t:est tape" which contained each of the critical items 
played once, plus four items not included in the "presentation tape" 
(zero-presented items). After hearing each musical selection in the 
test tape, subjects estimated the number of times that selection was 
heard in the presentation tape. Subjects had approximately 10-seconds 
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between each selection in which to estimate frequency for each song. 
After the test tape was played and frequency estimations were completed, 
the experimenter played an 11-minute "expertise tape" in which subjects 
were required to identify the titles and artists of the critical 
(judged) items which were used in the high knowledge, familiar song 
tape. All songs were ordered randomly in this tape. The "musical 
expertise " tape was used as a measure of each individual's familiarity 
and knowledge of popular music in general. After this tape was played, 
subjects were debriefed and dismissed. 
Subjects in both high and low familiarity "frequency" conditions 
were instructed to listen to the musical selections in order to prepare 
for a test of estimating the frequency with which each song would be 
played. Subjects in both "memory test" conditions were told to listen 
to the musical selections in preparation for a following "test of mem-
ory" for the musical selections. Subjects in both "distractor" condi-
tions were presented with a 40-question math aptitude test, and were 
told to ignore the audio tape being played in the background. Hare spe-
cifically, they were told that the math test was a primary task in the 
experiment. 
After the presentation tape was played under each of the above 
conditions, all groups were then required to estimate frequency and to 
attempt to identify the title and artist of the critical familiar items. 
29 
Musical Excerpts 
The "presentation tapes" consisted of 52, 10-second musical 
excerpts, with 7 -to 10-second silent intervals between each excerpt. 
These tapes were based on 16 critical selections. That is, of 16 criti-
cal selections, items were presented with varying frequencies. Specifi-
cally, four items were played once, four items were played twice, four 
items were played three times, and four items were played four times 
(4+8+12+16=40). In addition to these 40 items, one song was played six 
times throughout the tape, but was not to be judged. Similarly, four 
songs \>Jere played at the beginning of the tape and two were played at 
the end of the tape which were not to be judged (thus equalling 52 
excerpts). These additional items were included in the tape so that not 
every song would be a critical item. Hore specifically, the non-critical 
songs at the beginning of the tape were to control for any possible pri-
macy effects of the list, and the non-critical songs at the end of the 
tape were to control for any possible recency effects of the list. 
Assignment of songs to frequency level was random. In addition, the 
sequence of songs in the tape was randomized with the restriction that 
no song would be played within three positions of a previous presenta-
tion of that song (i.e., a minimum of three different songs between each 
repetition). 
The "test tape" consisted of 20, 10-second musical excerpts, with 
7- to 10-second silent intervals between each excerpt. Sixteen of these 
excerpts were the critical (to-be- judged) items heard in the "presenta-
tion tape", whereas four of these songs were not played in that tape. 
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All songs were randomly ordered. 
Sub~c~ 
Participants in this experiment were 180 students from the intro-
ductory psychology subject pool at Loyola University of Chicago. Thirty 
subjects participated in each experimental condition, and assignment to 
conditions was random. Subjects within each condition were tested in 




The key issues that were investigated in this experiment were; (a) 
the effect of stimulus familiarity on frequency judgment accuracy, (b) 
the effect of instructional set on frequency judgment accuracy, and (c) 
the effect of stimulus knowledge on frequency judgment accuracy. If the 
cognitive processing of frequency information is wholly automatic, then 
there should be no differences in frequency judgment accuracy among per-
sons who process familiar or unfamiliar music, respectively. Similarly, 
if frequency information processing is wholly automatic, then instruc-
tions orienting the subjects to perform different tasks with the infor-
mation should not affect frequency judgment accuracy. 
For the purpose of the present experiment, it is now necessary to 
distinguish between absolute accuracy and relative accuracy. "Absolute 
accuracy" refers to \vhen persons assign correct estimates when judging 
frequency. In this case, persons are accurate only if their frequency 
estimates are the same as the true presentation frequencies (for exam-
ple, persons are absolutely correct if they estimate that an item was 
presented 12 times, when in fact it was presented 12 times). In con-
trast, "relative accuracy" refers to subjects' frequency discrimination 
ability for items presented at varying frequency levels. For example, a 
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subject exhibits relative accuracy if he estimates that an item pre-
sented four times was in fact heard more then an item presented three 
times. Similarly, once-presented items should be judged as occurring 
less frequently then twice-presented items. A subject who is able to 
discriminate the frequency with which items of varying frequency levels 
are presented, is said to exhibit relative accuracy. 
Three measures of frequency judgment accuracy were employed: 
"hits", "relative accuracy scores", and mean estimates. "Hits" repre-
sented correct absolute frequency judgments. For example, if a song was 
presented three times on the tape, and a person estimated that the song 
was presented three times, that subject scored a hit. The second meas-
ure of "relative accuracy" was represented by two statistics: (1) a 
transformed- r score for each subject, and (2) an overall correlation 
score for each subject. For the transformed- r measure, correlations 
were calculated between mean presentation (actual) frequencies of songs 
and their mean estimated frequencies for each subject. Nore specifi-
cally, four songs were presented in each of the four frequency levels 
(four songs were presented once, twice, etc.). The means for each fre-
quency level (based on four observations per level) were calculated for 
each subject 1 s estimates and correlated with the "true" frequencies. 
This correlation was then taken to a tabled set of values to obtain a 
standardized score for each correlation. An additional measure of rela-
tive accuracy was not based on means (as above), but on individual item 
estimates. For this measure, estimates for every item presented once 
through four times was correlated with each item 1 s true presentation 
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frequency for each subject. Therefore, this correlation was based on 16 
items per subject. Although these two measures of relative accuracy 
correlated satisfactorily ( r =.75), results for each will be presented. 
The final measure consisted of the mean estimates given for each fre-
quency level. For example, if for the once-presented items, a subject 
estimated that each had been played 1,1, 2, and 2 times respectively, 
that subject would have a mean estimate score for that frequency level 
of 1. 5. Each subject therefore had an overall hit score, two overall 
relative accuracy scores, and mean estimate scores. 
Items heard 1,2,3, or 4 times on the "presentation tape" were ana-
lyzed separately from items not presented on that tape (zero-items). 
This was done since it was assumed that different processes were 
involved in these two frequency categories. When a zero-item is heard 
on the test tape (a song that was not heard on the presentation tape) a 
simple "yes or no" recognition decision is called for. This type of 
decision is fundamentally different from estimating "how many" times a 
song was previously heard. For this reason all items never heard before 
were analyzed separately from items heard either once, twice, three 
times, or four times. 
While overall knowledge differences were represented by the 
between-group variable of song familiarity, a within-group measure of 
music knowledge was employed by calculating each subject's total number 
of song and artist identifications from the "musical expertise" tape. 







The main analysis strategy consisted of a series of between and 
within subject analyses of variance. These analyses will be discussed 
as they apply to each of the key areas investigated. 
Frequency Judgment Accuracy 
as Measured by Hits 
The hit frequency judgment scores for items heard once through 
four times were analyzed via a 2(familiarity) X 3(instruction) analysis 
of variance. Mean hits for each of the six groups are presented in Table 
1. 
Regarding instructional set, the results revealed a highly signif-
icant difference in hits among groups who either (1) were told that they 
would have to judge frequency, (2) were told to expect an unspecified 
memory test, or (3) performed a distractor task and were told to ignore 
the material, F (2,174)=19.60, p <.01. These results suggest that ori-
enting subjects to perform different tasks with the stimulus information 
affects the accuracy of absolute frequency judgments. More specifi-
cally, a planned comparisons analysis compared both frequency and memory 
test groups (weighted together) to the dis tractor group. The results 
from this analysis showed that frequency and memory test groups differed 
substantially from the third (distractor) group as predicted by Greene 
(1984), F (1,174)=35.38, p <.01. 
Regarding familiarity, the ANOVA revealed a highly significant 
difference in accuracy of absolute frequency judgments between groups 
who estimated familiar versus unfamiliar songs, F (1, 174 )=67 .19, p 
<. 01. These results suggest that knmdedge of stimulus material, as 
TABLE 1 
Hit Accuracy, Instructional Set, and Familiarity 
Mean Hit Frequency Judgments for Six Groups as 
a Function of Instructional Set and Familiarity 
Instructions 
Group Frequency Memory Test Distractor Overall 
Familiar Music 7.83 7.20 4.47 6.50 
Unfamiliar Music 4.63 3.77 3.17 3.86 
Overall 6.23 5.48 3.82 




represented by familiarity, affects the ability to judge the absolute 
number of times an item was presented. Subjects judging familiar songs 
were far more accurate in their absolute frequency judgments than sub-
jects judging unfamiliar songs. 
This analysis also revealed an interaction between familiarity and 
instructions, F (2,174)=4.39, p <.05. This interaction was due to the 
fact that subjects' estimates in the familiar and unfamiliar conditions 
were more similar in the distractor group then they were for the fre-
quency and memory test groups. That is, while the accuracy performance 
of subjects judging familiar music was clearly superior to that of sub-
jects judging unfamiliar music in the frequency and memory test groups, 
this difference was not as great for the distractor groups. 
An additional 2(familiarity) X 3(instruction) X 4(frequency level) 
ANOVA performed on subject's hits (for items presented once through four 
times) confirmed a main effect for familiarity, F (1,174)=66.43, p 
<.01, a main effect for instructions, F (2,174)=18.43, p <.01, and an 
interaction between familiarity and instructions, F (2,174)=5.60, p 
<. 01. In addition, interactions between familiarity and frequency 
level, F (3,522)=8.47, p <.01, and instructions and frequency level, F 
(6,522)=5.22, p <.01 were obtained. These interactions will be dis-
cussed in the context of similar results from other analyses, below. 
Frequency Judgment Accuracy 
as Measured by Relative 
Scores 
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The relative accuracy scores or transformed- r scores (1-4 items) 
were analyzed using a 2(familiarity) X 3(instruction) analysis of vari-
ance. Mean relative accuracy scores for each of the six groups are pre-
sented in Table 2. The rasults regarding instructional set revealed a 
significant difference between groups in the accuracy of their relative 
frequency judgments, F (2,174)=3.98, p <.05. As above, planned compar-
isons revealed that the distractor group was poorer in frequency judg-
ment accuracy compared to the other two groups, F (1,174)=7.63, p <.01. 
While both measures of hits and relative accuracy scores did show 
significant differences in accuracy between groups who were given dif-
ferent instructions, hits (absolute judgments) in contrast to relative 
judgments, seemed to be more strongly affected by instructional set. 
Results from the ANOVA regarding familiarity revealed a signifi-
cant difference in the relative accuracy of frequency judgments between 
groups who estimated familiar versus unfamiliar songs, F (1,174)=6.12, 
p <.05. Similarly, these results suggest that although familiarity 
affects the accuracy of relative frequency judgments to some degree, 
relative judgments are less affected by familiarity than are absolute 
judgments. This issue is clarified by examining mean frequency judg-
ments as a function of presentation frequency and familiarity condition. 
No interactions were present in this analysis. 
A second measure of relative accuracy consisted of correlations 
between each item's presentation frequency and its estimated frequency 
TABLE 2 
Relative Accuracy, Instructional Set, and Familiarity 
Mean Relative Accuracy Scores for Six Groups as 
a Function of Instructional Set and Familiarity 
Instructions 
Group Frequency Memory Test Distractor Overall 
Familiar Music 1.77 1.71 1.29 1. 59 
Unfamiliar Music 1.32 1.47 1.24 1.34 
Overall 1.54 1. 59 1. 27 




for each subject. Using a 2(familiarity) X 3(instruction) ANOVA as 
above, the results yield similar conclusions. Mean correlations for each 
of the six groups are presented in Table 3. 
Results from this analysis revealed a main effect for familiarity, 
F (1,174)=17.11, p <.01 and a main effect for instructions, F 
(2,174)=16.55, p <.01. In addition, an interaction between familiarity 
and instructional set was obtained, F (2,174)=3.71, p <.05. This 
interaction was due to the following facts: for frequency and memory 
test conditions, subjects judging familiar music were more accurate than 
subjects judging unfamiliar music, but familiarity did not differen-
tially affect performance in the dis tractor group. Therefore, in the 
distractor group, familiarity did not affect frequency judgment accuracy 
as it did in the other two instructional conditions. This result con-
curs with the familiarity by instructions interaction obtained using the 
hits measure. 
Frequency Judgment Accuracy 
as Measured by Mean 
Estimates 
A 2(familiarity) X 3(instruction) X 4(frequency level) ANOVA per-
formed on subject's mean frequency estimates revealed significant 
effects for instructional set, F (2,174)=3.15, p <.05, and familiarity, 
F (1,174)=26.72, p <.01. Overall means for this analysis are presented 
in Table 4. 
Regarding instructional set, converging results from analyses of 
hits, relative accuracy scores, and mean estimates sug;:rest that there 
may indeed be an effect of instructional set on frequency judgment 
TABLE 3 
Mean Correlations, Instructional Set, and Familiarity 
Mean Correlations Between Estimated and 
Actual Frequency for Six Groups as a 
Function of Instructional Set and Familiarity 
Instructions 
Group Frequency Memory Test Distractor Overall 
Familiar Music .70 . 67 . 44 . 61 
Unfamiliar Music .52 .53 .43 
Overall .61 .60 .44 
Kate: Higher correlations represent greater 




Mean Estimates, Actual Frequency, and Instructional Set 
Mean Frequency Judgments Overall as a Function 







1 2 3 4 Overall 
1. 34 2.65 3.40 3.75 2.79 
1. 49 2.93 3.63 3.91 2.99 
1.41 2.58 3.19 3.23 2.60 
1.41 2. 72 3.41 3.63 
Note: Mean scores closer to the presentation 




accuracy. Furthermore, this effect seems to manifest itself by causing 
an accuracy decrement in distractor conditions. There appears to be no 
differential effect for instructional set between subjects in frequency 
and memory test conditions. 
In addition, the results from the above ANOVA revealed a highly 
significant effect for familiarity. Converging results from analyses of 
hits, relative accuracy scores, and mean estimates suggest that there 
may be an effect of stimulus familiarity on frequency judgment accuracy. 
Groups judging unfamiliar music are less accurate than groups judging 
familiar music in terms of both absolute frequency judgments, and rela-
tive frequency judgments. 
An examination of subjects' mean estimates reveals why the effects 
of instructional set and familiarity are stronger for the "hit" measure 
(absolute correct judgments) in contrast to the relative accuracy score 
(relative correct judgments) measure. }1eans for each frequency level 
are presented in Table 5. As can be seen, subjects judging unfamiliar 
songs appear to be overestimating the true presentation frequencies. 
This effect is apparent by considering the consistently higher mean 
estimates of the unfamiliar music conditions compared to the familiar 
music conditions, regardless of presentation , frequency level. Persons 
judging unfamiliar music are inflating their estimates compared to per-
sons judging familiar music. 
The above analysis also revealed an interaction between familiar-
ity and frequency level, F (3,522)=4.27, p <.01, as well as an interac-
tion between instructions and frequency level, F (6,522)=2.79, p <.05. 
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TABLE 5 
Mean Estimates, Actual Frequency, and Familiarity 
Mean Frequency Judgments Overall as a Function 
of Presentation Frequency and Familiarity Condition 
Presentation Frequency 
Group 1 2 3 4 Overall 
Familiar ~lusic 1. 09 2.49 2.93 3.35 2.47 
Unfamiliar Music 1. 73 2.95 3.88 3.92 3.12 
Overall 1. 41 2.72 3.41 3.63 
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The familiarity by frequency level interaction was due to a "ceiling 
effect" exhibited by persons judging unfamiliar music. While the unfa-
miliar groups consistently overestimated the true frequencies of the 
presented items relative to the familiar groups, less overestimation 
occured for items presented four times. The instruction by frequency 
level interaction was due to the overall poor a~curacy of the distractor 
groups. Relative to the other two groups (frequency and memory test), 
the distractor groups' estimates were higher at the lo~v presentation 
frequency range, and lower near the high presentation frequency range. 
Accuracy as a Function of 
Individual Knowledge 
Differences 
Each subject in the experiment heard a "musical expertise" tape in 
which he/she was required to identify the names and performers of vari-
ous contemporary rock songs. The identification (ID) score for each 
subject represented the number of times that that subject provided the 
correct title of a song, or the correct performer of a song. These cor-
rect identifications were summed for each subject. Since there were 15 
songs on this tape, a possible ID score range for each subject included 
0 to 30 correct identifications. Subjects within each of the six groups 
were rank ordered according to their ID scores. The middle two ranks in 
each group were dropped in order to prevent ties. Subjects above the 
median in each group represented "high knowledge" persons, and subjects 
belov; the median represented "low knowledge" persons. 
The hit scores for each subject were then analyzed using a 
2(familiarity) X 3(instruction) X 2(music knowledge) analysis of vari-
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ance. The results from this analysis confirmed a main effect for 
instructional set, F (2,156)=22.98, p <.01, a main effect for familiar-
ity, F (1,156)=68.39, p <.01, in addition to a main effect for music 
knowledge, F (1,156)=8.88, p <.01. This analysis revealed no interac-
tions. Means for twelve groups are presented in Table 6. 
Therefore subjects with high music knowledge, as operationalized 
by their ability to identify the titles and performers of popular songs, 
were more accurate in their judgments of absolute frequency than sub-
jects low in music knowledge. 
A similar analysis was performed on subject's relative accuracy 
scores (represented by transformed- r scores). The results again showed 
significant effects for music knowledge, F (1,156)=7.02, p <.05, famil-
iarity, F (1,156)=5.31, p <.05, and instructional set, F (2,156)=3.72, 
p <. 05. No interactions were obtained. Means for 12 groups are pre-
sented in Table 7. 
As with the instruction and familiarity variables, relative accu-
racy scores exhibited a weaker effect than hits, for the music knowledge 
variable. Therefore, music knowledge seems to affect absolute frequency 
judgment accuracy more than relative frequency judgment accuracy. 
Results from these analyses suggests that the individual difference 
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variable of stimulus knowledge affects frequency judgment accuracy. 
As above, a 2(familiarity) X 3(instruction) X 2(music knowledge) 
ANOVA was performed on correlations between each item's true and esti-
mated frequency for each subject. r-1ean correlations for the twelve 
groups are presented in Table 8. 
TABLE 6 
Hit Accuracy and Husic Knowledge 
Hean Hits as a Function of Husic Knowledge, 
Familiarity, and Instructional Set 
High Knowledge Low Knowledge 
Group Familiar Unfamiliar Familiar Unfamiliar 
Frequency 8. 71 5.21 6.71 4.43 
Hemory Test 7.71 4.07 6.50 3.28 
Distractor 5.07 2.71 3.86 3.00 
Overall 5.58 4.63 
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TABLE 7 
Relative Accuracy and Nusic Knowledge 
Nean Relative Accuracy Scores as a Function of Music 
Knowledge, Familiarity, and Instructional Set 
High Knowledge Low Knowledge 
Group Familiar Unfamiliar Familiar Unfamiliar 
Frequency 1. 83 1.48 1. 62 1.15 
Nemory Test 1. 85 1. 34 1. 41 1. 62 
Dis tractor 1.49 1.46 1.14 .90 
Overall 1. 57 1. 31 
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TABLE 8 
Mean Correlations and Music Knowledge 
Mean Correlations Between Estimated and Actual 
Frequency for Twelve Groups as a Function of 
Instructional Set, Familiarity, and Music Knowledge 
High Knowledge Low Knowledge 
Group Familiar Unfamiliar Familiar Unfamiliar 
Frequency .75 .57 .65 .46 
~lemory Test .74 .51 .59 .52 
Dis tractor .45 .51 .42 .32 
Overall .59 .49 
48 
49 
Results from this analysis revealed a main effect for familiarity, 
F (1,156)=18.53, p <.Ol, a main effect for instructional set, F 
(2,156)=18.25, p <.01, as well as a main effect for music knowledge, F 
(1,156)=12.58, p <.01. Again, subjects high in music knowledge were 
more accurate in their estimates of frequency than subjects low in music 
knowledge. This analysis also revealed an interaction between instruc-
tional set and familiarity, F (2,156)=3.22, p <.05, as did earlier 
analyses. 
In addition to the above analyses, within group correlations were 
obtained between subjects' identification scores, and the accuracy meas-
ures of hits, transformed- r and item correlation scores, respectively. 
These correlations are presented in Table 9. 
In agreement with results from previous analyses, correlations 
between accuracy and identifications tended to be greater for the inten-
tional processing (frequency and memory test) groups then for the dis-
tractor groups. Similarly, these correlations tended to be greater for 
the familiar groups then for the unfamiliar groups. Although these 
results were not uniform across all measures, the hit measure revealed 
these trends most strongly. This fact agrees with the results of prior 
analyses which showed the superiority of the hit measure in reflecting 
accuracy differences. 
TABLE 9 
Correlations Between Accuracy Neasures and ID Scores 
Hits Transformed-r Item Corr. 
Group Fam. Unfam. Fam . Unfam. Fam. Unfam 
Frequency .42 . 14 .14 .33 .35 .29 
Nemory Test .37 .18 .45 -.28 .64 -.01 
Distractor .22 .05 .13 .28 .08 .38 
Note: Higher correlations represent greater a relationship 
between accuracy and identification. 
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Music Knowledge Differences 
Between Croups 
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It was important to establish that subjects in each of the six 
experimental conditions did not differ in their average music knowledge. 
For example, consider a case where one group is outstanding in terms of 
of music knowledge, compared to the other five groups. This fact alone 
could account for frequency judgment accuracy differences which might 
otherwise be attributed to instructional set or familiarity. 
The ID sum scores for all subjects were analyzed via a 
2 (familiarity) X 3 (instruction) analysis of variance. The absence of 
any significant relationships in this data suggests that each group was 
equivalent in terms of its overall music knowledge. Other relationships 
obtained are thus not attributable to knowledge differences between 
groups. 
Analysis of Z era-Presented 
Items 
Since it is suggested that the judgment decisions involved in 
judging zero-items and once through four times-presented items are fun-
damentally different, the data for each of these were analyzed sepa-
rately. Hits on zero-items for the six groups were analyzed using a 
2(familiarity) X 3(instruction) analysis of variance. The results 
showed no differences between the groups in their ability to judge 
whether or not a song was previously presented. 
Each subject's mean frequency estimate for the zero-items was then 
analyzed using a similar ANOVA. Again, no significant differences were 
obtained. Regardless of stimulus familiarity or orienting instructions, 
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subjects appear to be equally accurate in terms of judging whether or 
not a song was presented earlier. 
Regarding the effect of music knowledge on estimates for zero-i-
tems, a 2(familiarity) X 3(instruction) X 2(music knowledge) analysis of 
variance was performed on each subject's mean estimate for the zero-i-
tems. The results from this analysis showed that persons high in music 
knowledge were better able to judge whether or not a song was previously 
presented, than persons low in music knowledge, F (1,156)=4.31, p <.05. 
Results from this analysis also revealed a main effect for instructional 
set, F (2,156)=3.43, p <.05. The main effect obtained for instruc-
tional set appears to contradict results from the above analysis. How-
ever, in the present analysis, 12 subjects (two from each group) were 
dropped, thus reducing the variability of the groups. This caused the 
otherwise non-significant result to barely reach significance. Subjects 
were dropped in order to prevent ties in the median-split for high ver-
sus low music knowledge. The effect obtained in this analysis was due 
to the distractor groups' overestimation of the zero-items. For the dis-
tractor conditions, the average estimate for zero-items was .54, com-
pared to average estimates of .33 and .21 for memory test and frequency 
groups, respectively. Subjects low in music knowledge tended to inflate 
zero-item estimates, thus paralleling results from the unfamiliar stimu-
lus condition. 
A similar ANOVA performed on hits for zero-items provided confirm-
ing results regarding the superiority of high music knowledge persons. 
Subjects high in music knowledge were more accurate in terms of recog-
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nizing a song that was not previously presented , compared to subjects 
low in music knowledge, F (1,156)=26.47, p <.01. 
Effect of Song Presentation 
Order on Frequency 
Judgments 
A sample of songs used in the present experiment was selected and 
tested for any effects of song presentation order on frequency estirna-
tion. For each frequency level, frequency judgments of songs in the 
first half of the audio presentation (block A) were compared to fre-
quency judgments of songs in the second half of the audio presentation 
(block B). \Hthin each experimental condition, half of the subjects 
heard block A followed by block B, and the other half of the subjects 
heard block B followed by block A. A series of t -tests on mean esti-
mates for each frequency level for both blocks revealed no significant 
differences. For example, "Jump" was a twice-presented item. Mean fre-
quency estimates of this song when it was presented in block A were corn-
pared to mean frequency estimates when it was presented in block B. 
Therefore, mean frequency estimates were compared within songs, or 
across blocks. These estimates did not differ significantly. Songs in 
one block were not over- or under-estimated compared to songs in the 
other block. This finding suggests that the effects on frequency judg-
rnent accuracy are not due to the order of presentation of the songs or 
to peculilarities within the particular list of songs. 
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Cover Task Effectiveness 
To verify the effectiveness of the distractor manipulation, the 
mathematical aptitude tests (used as a cover task) were scored for per-
centage of items completed, as well as percentage of items correct. 
Sixty subjects (thirty in the familiar-distractor group and thirty in 
the unfamiliar-distractor group) attempted the math test. The average 
completion rate for subjects, out of 53 possible problems, was 42 prob-
lems attempted, with a range of 29 to 53 (four persons attempted every 
problem). This result suggests that the test was challenging enough to 
occupy the subjects for at least the 18-minutes required to hear the 
"presentation " tape. The scoring of a random sample of the math skills 
tests revealed an average correct answer score of greater than 89 per-
cent. Although there is no base to use as a comparison, this result 
clearly suggests that subjects were attending to the cover task, and 
performing it at a satisfactory level. The cover task appeared to be 
effective, as evidenced by the performance attempts exhibited by the 
subjects thus verifying the incidental nature of the distractor condi-
tion. 
CHAPTER V 
COKCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
I nstructiona/ Set 
The importance of carefully examining and defining task instruc-
tions is highlighted by Kaus ler, Lichty, and Hakami (1984). For exam-
ple, these authors state that evidence for support of an automatic pro-
cessing of frequency information hypothesis derives mostly from studies 
indicating equivalent performance levels on frequency judgment tasks in 
which subjects are told of an upcoming frequency estimation test, or 
told of an upcoming unspecified memory test. However, these authors 
criticize this methodology because subjects in both groups are informed 
in advance of item presentations that they will receive a subsequent 
memory test. Furthermore, these authors state that such conditions dif-
fer only in that the group informed of an upcoming frequency estimation 
task knows precisely what item attribute will eventually be tested, 
while the group informed of a "memory test" knows only that some unspec-
ified item attribute will eventually be tested. "In either case, 
instructing subjects as to a future memory test is likely to activate a 
rehearsal strategy for processing items during the course of their pres-
entations. That strategy may, in fact, be quite similar for the two 
instructional conditions, thus conceivably accounting for their compara-
ble performance levels on the frequency judgment task "(p.660). 
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Rather, these authors are concerned with frequency estimation per-
formance of groups who do not have any intent to memorize item informa-
tion. Such groups would not experience any activation of a rehearsal 
strategy. Therefore, the orientation of Kausler, Lichty, and Hakami 
(1984) is similar to that of Greene (1984) in that a critical test of 
the automaticity of frequency information lies in a comparison between 
groups who are activating, or likely to activate, a rehearsal strategy, 
and groups not adopting a rehearsal strategy. Regarding the present 
experiment, the "distractor" condition represents what Greene (1984) 
calls "incidental", and what Kausler, Lichty, and Hakami (1984) call 
"truly incidental." While the terminology may differ, these labels all 
apply to the same experimental situation. 
It is interesting to note a more historical point which is also 
highlighted by Kausler, et al. (1984), although they do not cite it as 
such. Essentially, they suggest that what was once evidence for the 
automatic processing of frequency information, may no longer be valid. 
Research examining differences between "frequency" and "memory test" 
conditions may merely be investigating similar processes delineated by 
different labels. Therefore, what was once evidence for automatic pro-
cessing may now become an expected outcome. By expanding the nomologi-
cal net of constructs (via inclusion of distractor, or no-rehearsal par-
adigms), the true conduct of automatic processes are more closely 
approximated. 
Perhaps most importantly, the above authors show why it is crucial 
to thoroughly examine task instructions. The investigators must be sure 
57 
that their experimental manipulations in fact reflect different 
cognitive operations. They must be sure that null effects obtained are 
not merely due to assessment of ident~cal processes. 
Results from the present experiment resemble those found by Greene 
(1984). Intentional learning groups are more accurate in their fre-
quency judgments than incidental learning groups. While Greene inter-
prets these findings as support for the claim that "there is no strong 
evidence for the automatic encoding of frequency information" (p. 90), 
the issue may not be that simple. 
While it is true that intentional groups perform better than inci-
dental groups, it is useful to consider the groups' absolute perform-
ance. Although the distractor (incidental learning) group did not per-
form as well as the other groups, their performance was still rather 
good, especially when the nature of the task is taken into considera-
tion. Recall that subjects in the distractor condition were performing 
a math test, told to ignore the music, and in one group, exposed to 
music they had never before heard. Despite the adversity of these con-
ditions, subjects' mean estimates generally increased as true presenta-
tion frequencies increased. In addition, subjects' estimates in these 
groups were generally close to the true frequencies. Given this fact, 
it is difficult to entirely dismiss the claim that frequency information 
is processed automatically. Perhaps it is more appropriate to suggest 
that automatic cognitive processing, like any processing, may have its 
limits. However in the present experiment, while the limits surely were 
tested, some degree of automatic processing is still app'"·: ent. 
58 
A related issue concerns the differential reception of stimulus 
material between intentional and incidental learning groups. An argu-
ment could be made that persons in the distractor group are simply not 
receiving all of the stimulus information, and hence are not as accurate 
as other groups in judging frequency because they never get the informa-
tion. However, such a claim seems invalid. Examination of analyses per-
formed on the zero-items shows only a small difference between groups in 
their ability to judge these items. Incidental, as well as intentional 
learning groups appear equally able to recognize a song that they did or 
did not hear in a previous tape. Results from one analysis did reveal 
an effect for instructional set (however, the dropping of subjects in 
this analysis was responsible for a reduction in the groups' variabil-
ity, causing the effect to barely reach significance). Except for this 
last finding, overall, the results suggest that the dis tractor groups 
are receiving and processing the information despite experimental 
instructions directed towards the inhibition of this process. Subjects 
appear to be processing some information despite their conscious effort 
to ignore the information. 
Fisk and Schneider also found differences in frequency judgment 
accuracy between groups who processed information under different ori-
. enting conditions. These authors interpret the lack of differences 
observed by Hasher and Zacks (1979) as due to frequency encoding showing 
an early asymptote and little benefit from extended periods of con-
trolled processing. "Hence, we suggest that what Hasher and Zacks refer 
to as 'automatic encoding' be interpreted as early asymptotic controlled 
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process encoding of event frequency" (p.189). 
The point to be taken from such an exchange, as well as from the 
results of the present study, is that at what point do we consider a 
process automatic or controlled (non-automatic)? Hasher and Zacks, 
Greene, and Fisk and Schneider appear to interpret the facts by adopting 
different criteria for automaticity. Similarly, do the results from the 
present study tend to support or disconfirm an automatic processing 
theory of frequency information? According to Hasher and Zacks (1979), 
automatic processes should be unaffected by other controlled processes 
operating concurrently. Yet in the present study, the distractor group 
did experience a processing decrement as a function of other controlled 
(math test performance) processing. Should this result cause one to 
dismiss an automatic processing theory of frequency information despite 
the fact that persons in the distractor group were obviously still pro-
cessing frequency information automatically to some extent ? 
Regardless of the criteria which an investigator adopts for con-
sidering information processing automatic, the problem of explaining the 
decrement in distractor (incidental learning) groups' frequency judgment 
accuracy still remains. Why did subjects in the distractor groups per-
form more poorly than the subjects in the other groups in terms of fre-
quency judgment accuracy ? 
The possibility that these groups are not receiving information 
has already been ruled out, via analysis of the zero-presented items. 
Similarly, analyses of music knowledge scores suggest that this variable 
can not be causing the differences obtained between groups. The only 
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other two viable factors possibly affecting frequency judgment accuracy 
in distractor conditions are the II• II 1gnore instructions or the distractor 
task itself. 
It is doubtful that the mathematical skills test in and of itself 
could be responsible for the distractor groups' decrement. It is argued 
that listening to music and solving math problems are tasks that are 
extremely different, and hence unlikely to interfere with one another 
(compare the above tasks to learning word lists while performing reading 
comprehension tests, or other high-interference paradigms). 
The last viable alternative is to consider the fact that telling 
subjects to ignore the material somehow affects the processing of fre-
quency information. In such a case, subjects are presumably making a 
conscious attempt to avoid the musical stimuli. This controlled, con-
scious processing does seem to affect the automatic processing of fre-
quency information, albiet to a small degree. Again the issue becomes 
one of criteria. It is necessary to examine what implications that the 
above results have for an automatic processing theory of frequency 
information. Perhaps the most reasonable implication involves pointing 
out that an automatic process is not simply "unaffected" by orienting 
instructions. Alternatively, it is suggested that automatic processes 
represent a generally robust phenomena, even though under some circum-
stances, this capacity can be diminished. An automatic processing 
theory of frequency information is not to be discarded, but revised. 
Such a revision would include delineating the conduct of automatic pro-
cesses when pressed to their limits. 
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Stimulus Familiarity 
A similar argument can be made for the effects of stimulus famili-
arity on frequency judgment accuracy. The key analyses relating to a 
"familiarity effect" involve the absolute (hit) and relative accuracy 
scores. Groups judging familiar music are more accurate than groups 
judging unfamiliar music in terms of both absolute frequency judgments, 
and relative frequency judgments. 
The differences obtained are accountable for by a tendency for the 
groups judging unfamiliar music to overestimate item's presentation fre-
quencies. The explanation for such a result involves what will be 
called a "pooling of frequency information." It is suggested that sub-
jects hearing unfamiliar music are less able to discriminate between 
different songs than subjects hearing familiar music. Familiar songs 
are more distinct than unfamiliar songs. Familiar songs have been cog-
nitively elaborated upon with repeated exposure over time. Unfamiliar 
songs have not had such elaboration or establishment in memory, and 
hence may "sound alike". Since such songs are "similar sounding", sub-
jects tend to think that they heard a song more than they actually did. 
As such, presentations of similar sounding songs, generally lacking a 
discrimative element at that point, are pooled with the to-be- judged 
(critical) item. As a result, while the relative frequencies remain 
unaffected (for, example, items presented three times are judged as 
occurring more than items presented two times) the absolute frequencies 
are inflated due to a "pooling effect." 
A re-examination of Table 5 highlights this issue. The grand mean 
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for actual presentation frequencies is 2.5. The marginal mean for 
estimated frequency for familiarity conditions is 2.47 which is very 
close to the expected or actual mean. In contrast, the marginal mean 
for estimated frequency for unfamiliar conditions is 3.12. Such a dif-
ference between groups judging familiar versus unfamiliar music suggests 
that the latter subjects "heard" more songs than were actually pre-
sented. It is suggested that these results occurred because subjects 
were hearing more new information in the unfamiliar conditions. This 
new information, not yet discriminable, caused subjects to perceive some 
different songs as sounding alike. Therefore over many such judgments, 
a single presentation of a song will be counted, or estimated more than 
once. For example, consider a subject who perceives songs A and G as 
sounding alike. When song A is to be judged, presentations of songs A 
and G are combined when judgments are made. Similarly, when song G is 
to be judged, presentations of songs G and A are combined when judgments 
are made. 
While such estimate inflation may not be grand in scale, the above 
results clearly show that overestimation is occurring and, hence, has 
implications for automatic processing theories. Again, does the fact 
that familiarity of stimulus material affects• frequency judgment accur-
acy necessarily suggest that frequency information is not processed 
automatically ? 
As with a discussion of the effects of instructional set on fre-
quency judgment accuracy, it is suggested that an automatic processing 
theory be revised to include the qualification that although generally a 
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robust phenomenon, automatic processing may be impaired under conditions 
in which a great deal of new information is presented. Again, the con-
duct of automatic processes are further delineated when pressed to their 
limits. 
The importance of meaning, or semantic value of a stimulus in 
mediating frequency information processing is highlighted by Rao (1983), 
~·:ho examined the "word frequency effect" in situational frequency esti-
mation. Rao's investigation deals with linguistic frequency, which 
refers to the frequency with which words are encountered in everyday 
life. A general finding is that linguistic high-frequency (HLF) words 
are better recalled than are linguistic low-frequency (LLF) ~.;ords. "But 
in recognition memory, LLF words are better recognized than are HLF 
words. The finding that LLF words are better recalled whereas HLF words 
are better recognized is commonly refered to as the word frequency 
effect"(p. 73). It is argued that there is a great deal of similarity in 
the processing of recognition and frequency information, in addition to 
the similarity of their respective testing procedures. Rao suggests 
that if this unitary processing view is correct, manipulation of intrin-
sic characteristics of the item used such as concreteness of meaning and 
linguistic frequency would be expected to produce the same kind of 
effects in situational frequency judgment as it would in item recogni-
tion. 
In a series of experiments designed to examine the relationship of 
nonwords (items of the lowest possible frequency of occurrence) to the 
word frequency effect, Rao (Exp. 2) discovered an overall greater esti-
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mation of nomwrds. Results included the finding that at high 
situational frequencies, nonwords were given higher frequency estimates 
than LLF words. 
One hypothesis offered as an explanation for these results is that 
the intrinsic item characteristics of richness and meaning, and pro-
nounceability could affect frequency estimation. Rao cites Ghatala, et 
al. (1975) who demonstrated that when linguistic frequency is held con-
stant, the more meaningful items are given more accurate estimates. It 
is suggested that there are at least three item factors that could favor 
accurate situational frequency estimation: low linguistic frequency, 
high pronounceability, and high semantic content. 
Another experiment was conducted to test the prediction that pro-
nounceable nonwords should be given more accurate and discriminal fre-
quency estimates than should unpronounceable nonwords (Rao, Exp. 3). 
Results from this investigation revealed greater frequency estimate 
accuracy for pronounceable nonwords than for unpronounceable nonwords, 
in addition to overall su~erior discriminability of pronounceable non-
words. Rao concludes, in agreement with the theoretical inferences drawn 
by other investigators, that meaning is an important modifier of the 
word frequency effect. He suggests that if this were not the case, pro-
nounceable nonwords would have been given more accurate and discriminal 
frequency estimates than those given to LLF words. 
The results from Rao's experiment concurs with those of the pres-
ent study on two counts: (1) items lacking in meaningfulness tend to be 
overestimated, and (2) these meaningfulness effects may be related to 
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the discriminability of the critical items used in the estimation task. 
It is argued that although familiar music in the present esperiment is 
analogous to Rae's HLF words, unfamiliar music is analogous to his non-
words. This is the case because background frequency, in and of itself, 
is not the only mediator of frequency estimation accuracy: the meaning-
fulness dimension must also be taken into consideration as an intrinsic 
item characteristic mediating the accuracy of frequency judgments. In 
the present study, highly unfamiliar music is "nonmusic" (to integrate 
Rae's terminology) since it has little meaning and hence lacks discrim-
inability. 
Instructional Set and 
Familiarity Interaction 
ANOVA's performed on the correlations between true frequency and 
estimated frequency for each subject, and for hits for once through four 
times-presented items yielded an interaction between instructional set 
and familiarity. This effect was due to the fact that subjects judging 
familiar music were more accurate than subjects judging unfamiliar music 
in the frequency and memory test groups, but were not more accurate in 
the distractor group. Stimulus familiarity therefore had its greatest 
effect for frequency and memory test groups. Subjects in the distractor 
(incidental) conditions did more poorly than the other conditions, 
regardless of stimulus familiarity. 
Two alternative hypothesis can be offered to account for the above 
interaction: (1) the incidental nature of the distractor condition was 
salient such that the processing of frequency informatic:. was inhibited 
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regardless of stimulus familiarity, or (2) a "basement effect" was 
present in the distractor conditions judging unfamiliar music. The first 
of these hypotheses would suggest that because of the nature of the 
incidental task (i.e., the controlled processing of another concurrent 
stimulus), one should not expect to find great differences between 
groups in this condition because any processing of frequency information 
is likely to be inhibited. Stimulus familiarity would therefore not dif-
ferentially affect groups because of the a priori strength of the inci-
dental task itself. 
The second of these hypotheses, the basement effect, would argue 
that subjects in the unfamiliar music-distractor condition simply could 
not perform more poorly on this task. In such a case, the task itself 
puts a lower limit on subject's accuracy performance. Recall that the 
present experiment had only four frequency levels: items were presented 
once, twice, three times, and four times. 
The utility of these competing hypotheses could be assessed 
through an experiment similar to the present one. Such an experiment 
would simply raise and expand the range of frequency levels thus allow-
ing the unfamiliar music-distractor group to estimate frequency without 
a lower limit imposed by the task (for example, frequency levels might 
be 5, 10, 15, and 20 times presented, respectively). If no difference is 
found for familiarity within the distractor condition, then the basement 
effect could be given less credence. 
In summary, it is argued that the math test present in the dis-
tractor condition restricts the meaningful processing of the music 
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information, overall. Although this information is processed to some 
degree, the math test prevents full semantic elaboration of the music, 
regardless of its familiarity. 
Other Interactions 
One set of interactions was obtained between familiarity and fre-
quency level. This result was due to a "ceiling effect" exhibited by 
persons judging unfamiliar music. While the unfamiliar group had a ten-
dency to overestimate the true presentation frequencies of items rela-
tive to the familiar group, less overestimation occured for items pre-
sented four times. That is, subjects judging unfamiliar music exhibited 
less overestimation at the high presentation frequency level. While sub-
jects in the unfamiliar groups were generally less accurate than sub-
jects in the familiar groups, they nevertheless developed a sense of the 
range of frequencies with which items were presented. Given this knowl-
edge about the presentation frequency range, they were reluctant to make 
estimates that went beyond that range. This effect could be expected to 
occur regardless of the true range of presentation frequencies. For 
example, if items were presented once through thirty times, less overes-
timation would probably occur at the high end (25 to 30 times-presented) 
of the range, for subjects judging unfamiliar music. 
A second ·set of interactions was obtained betwee·n instructions and 
frequency level. This result was due to the poor discrimination perform-
ance of the distractor conditions. Examination of the distractor 
groups' performance relative to the other two groups (frequency and mem-
ory test) reveal the former to exhibit less discriminability. For the 
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low presentation frequencies, the distractor I groups estimates were 
higher than for the other two groups. Similarly, for the high presenta-
tion frequencies, the distractor groups 1 estimates were considerably 
lower than the other two groups. The relative lack of discriminability 
present in the distractor groups was responsible for the above interac-
tion. 
Music Knowledge as an 
Individual Difference 
Results from the present experiment suggests that persons who 
"knm,, more" about popular music are more accurate in their frequency 
judgments of musical stimuli than persons who know less about popular 
music. While the measure of music knowledge only involved identifying 
the titles and artists of popular songs, it is argued that persons able 
to make such identifications are "well versed" in popular music. It is 
remarkable that these "high knowledge" persons were often able to to 
give the name and performer of songs after hearing only about 7-seconds 
of an instrumental beginning, and then having only about 5-seconds to 
decide on and write down their identifications. Persons able to perform 
this task must surely be knowledgable of popular music. 
l'!usic knowledge as operationalized in this experiment also 
includes a familiarity component. In this sense, results from the music 
knowledge analyses reinforce that of the stimulus familiarity results. 
However this measure surely includes more than just a familiarity campo-
nent. Available memory reserves of sounds, performer names, group 
names, song titles, and song lyrics are required to perform the identi-
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fication tasks. 
Subjects ~dth knowledge of these components are better able to 
judge frequency than those without such knowledge. It is argued that 
songs for the high knowledge group are distinctive, salient, familiar, 
and have an affective component which enables persons to readily differ-
entiate between songs. In a sense, persons low in music knowledge are 
similar to subjects in the unfamiliar song conditions. In both cases, 
songs simply lack distinctiveness and hence remain undiscriminated. If 
such songs are not discriminable, frequency judgments will experience an 
accuracy decrement. 
\{hile persons high in music knowledge have cognitive musical 
structures which enable them to assimilate and recognize a good deal of 
new, incoming information, persons low in music knowledge are over-
whelmed by the same information. ~1uch in the same way that a chess 
expert can recognize and remember piece positioning on a chess board 
better than non-chess players, musical "experts" possess a facility 
superior to that of non-musical experts for processing musical informa-
tion. It is argued that this facility enables more knowledgable persons 
to articulate differences, and thus discriminate between similar 
instances or elements of a given event class. 
It is interesting to note that regardless of instructional set or 
familiarity condition, subjects were equally able to tell whether or not 
they had heard a song previously, but subjects high in music knowledge 
showed increased discrimination ability on this task (as evidenced by 
zero-item analyses). This fact could also be used to argue for an 
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"expertise" effect. While all subjects are generally good regarding the 
discrimination task of song recognition, persons high in music knowl-
edge, the "experts", exhibited discrimination ability for music beyond 
that of non-experts. In fact, examination of the grand mean for zero-
item hits, for high-knowledge subjects revealed that they rarely made an 
error (a grand mean of 3.65 hits, compared to a perfect mean of 4.00, 
for 84 subjects). This statistic is based on the number of zero-items 
estimated by each subject. That is, four new songs were heard in the 
test tape that were not heard in the presentation tape (representing the 
zero-items). For this "zero" frequency level, a perfect score would be 
represented by a hit on each of the four songs within that frequency 
level. Similarly, overall means are also based on this four-item sta-
tistic. It is clear that persons high in music knowledge possess a dis-
crimination ability for music which is above and beyond that of persons 
without such knowledge. 
Musical Selections as Event 
Stimuli 
The use of musical selections as stimulus events has expanded upon 
the body of knowledge relating to automatic processing. Incorporating 
musical stimuli into the present .experiment has proven to be fruitful 
for two reasons; (1) the automatic processing of frequency information 
has been shown to be apparent for a set of events other than verbal and 
pictoral stimuli, and (2) even though automatic processing is apparent, 
the limits of such processing have begun to be delineated. 
On the one hand, it is remarkable that persons judging unfamiliar 
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music while taking a math test and told to ignore the music, are still 
fairily accurate in frequency estimation tasks. In this sense, the 
automatic processing of frequency information is a robust phenomenon. 
On the other hand, circumstances have been investigated which suggest 
that the automatic processing of frequency information may be vulnerable 
to other, non-automatic processing factors thus challenging Hasher and 
Zacks (1979) proposition in its current form. 
The results from this experiment, like that of Rose and Rowe 
(1976), Greene (1984), and Fisk and Schneider (1984) show that instruc-
tional set can influence frequency estimation accuracy. In addition, it 
has been shown that persons judging familiar music are more accurate in 
frequency estimation tasks than persons judging unfamiliar music. 
Finally, persons with greater music knowledge are also more accurate in 
frequency estimation tasks than persons lower in music knowledge. The 
results from the present experiment suggest that while a straightforward 
theory of automatic processing of frequency information may be appropri-
ate for verbal learning, this theory could be revised to include limita-
tions when other event classes are considered. The use of musical stim-
uli in this experiment is a further step towards expanding the 
generalizability of automatic processing theories. 
REFERENCE NOTES 
1. Goldstein, D., Kosteski, D., & Hasher, L. Memory processes in 
learning disabled and nondisabled children. Nanuscript in press. 
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APPENDIX A 
HEA!'i FANILIARITY RATINGS A~D Sm1 ID SCORES FOR SONGS 
Nusical Selection Hean Familiarity 
Rating 
One Thing Leads To Another 
Let's Hear it for the Boy 
Jump 
I Want a New Drug 
Against All Odds 
Thriller 
Maniac 
Owner of a Lonely Heart 
Footloose 
Centerfold 
Too Nuch Time Un Ny Hands 
Urgent 
Heat of the Homent 
Start ~1e Up 
Born to Run 
Curly Shuffle 
Shake It Up 
Don't Tell Ne You Love Me 
~1odern Love 
In a Big Country 
Gettin' Ready 
~1akin' Hagic 
Keep On Playin' That Funky Music 
Our Song 
Let He Love You Once Before You Go 
Caroline 
Young ~1an 
Such a Woman 
Surf's Up 
Black Cat Shuffle 
Tip of Hy Tongue 
Give He Your Honey, Honey 
What's He Got 
Your Back Yard 
Hard Luck 
What You Genna' Do 
Under the Gun 























































































































1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 2 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
3 1 3 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
2 0 0 1 
0 1 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
DATA USED IN ANALYSES 
Presentation Frequency 
1 2 3 
I. Familiar-Frequency 
1 0 0 1 
0 1 1 1 
5 1 0 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 2 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
2 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
2 1 2 1 
1 1 2 1 
1 1 2 1 
1 1 1 3 
1 1 1 0 
0- 2 0 1 
0 1 1 1 
0 1 0 3 
0 1 0 1 
0 1 1 1 
1 1 2 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 0 1 
1 1 3 1 
1 0 0 0 
2 3 0 2 
2 4 3 2 
2 3 2 2 
2 4 1 2 
4 5 2 3 
2 2 1 1 
4 3 4 3 
2 3 1 2 
3 1 2 2 
2 2 2 3 
4 3 2 3 
2 3 3 0 
4 4 2 2 
3 4 2 2 
4 4 5 4 
3 5 3 2 
3 2 3 1 
4 2 2 0 
2 3 2 0 
2 3 3 3 
3 1 2 1 
3 2 2 2 
2 3 2 1 
3 2 2 2 
2 2 1 1 
2 4 1 1 
5 3 3 2 
4 4 2 2 
2 5 1 1 
3 0 5 3 
3 3 4 3 
3 4 3 1 
4 3 3 2 
2 3 3 2 
3 4 4 5 
3 3 3 3 
3 3 2 3 
2 3 2 3 
2 2 3 3 
3 2 3 2 
3 4 3 2 
2 2 4 3 
4 2 4 3 
2 3 1 4 
3 5 1 2 
3 4 4 3 
2 4 4 2 
3 2 5 5 
2 1 3 2 
3 3 2 3 
3 2 3 2 
3 3 3 2 
3 2 3 2 
3 4 4 5 
3 4 2 2 
3 3 3 1 
4 4 3 4 
4 3 4 3 
2 3 3 2 
4 
3 3 1 2 
5 3 2 4 
6 2 2 2 
4 3 3 3 
3 2 4 4 
4 5 3 4 
4 4 5 2 
4 3 2 4 
4 4 2 3 
5 3 3 5 
3 3 1 4 
4 3 2 4 
4 4 4 4 
3 3 3 6 
3 4 3 4 
7 5 7 8 
4 3 4 5 
2 3 3 4 
5 3 4 6 
4 3 2 2 
7 2 4 3 
4 4 3 5 
3 4 4 3 
3 2 1 3 
3 2 5 2 
3 5 5 4 
"3 4 2 4 
5 4 5 5 
4 4 4 4 































































0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 2 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
2 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
2 0 2 3 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 2 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
II. Familiar-Memory Test 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 3 1 
1 1 1 2 
1 1 1 2 
3 1 0 1 
0 1 1 1 
0 1 0 0 
0 1 1 1 
2 1 2 3 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 2 1 
1 1 0 1 
1 1 1 1 
0 2 0 1 
1 1 0 0 
1 3 0 3 
1 1 2 1 
1 1 1 2 
1 1 2 1 
1 1 0 1 
1 0 0 2 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 0 1 
1 1 1 1 
0 1 3 2 
1 1 2 1 
1 3 1 1 
1 1 2 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 3 0 
3 4 2 2 
3 2 3 3 
3 2 3 2 
2 4 3 2 
6 4 6 3 
2 3 3 1 
3 3 1 1 
3 3 3 2 
5 4 2 2 
2 2 1 2 
2 2 2 2 
4 3 2 2 
5 2 2 2 
4 3 2 3 
3 2 2 0 
7 5 8 4 
2 3 2 1 
3 3 3 2 
4 7 3 2 
4 3 4 6 
2 3 1 2 
2 4 3 1 
2 3 2 1 
2 4 3 3 
3 4 2 2 
2 3 2 2 
2 3 2 4 
3 5 2 2 
3 4 2 2 
3 3 2 2 
2 4 4 3 
2 3 3 2 
3 2 1 1 
3 3 4 4 
3 4 3 3 
2 3 2 2 
3 3 3 1 
3 2 2 4 
5 4 6 5 
2 2 3 3 
4 3 2 1 
3 3 4 1 
3 4 2 6 
3 1 5 1 
4 2 3 2 
3 5 6 4 
3 2 3 1 
4 3 4 2 
5 4 6 5 
6 4 1 3 
2 3 2 2 
5 3 5 3 
3 1 3 3 
3 3 3 2 
3 3 3 4 
3 4 2 3 
4 3 4 4 
3 3 3 2 
5 3 7 2 
4 3 2 3 
3 3 3 5 
5 4 3 5 
5 2 0 4 
5 6 2 5 
5 1 4 4 
5 3 2 4 
5 4 3 4 
4 4 4 5 
6 3 5 5 
5 3 2 4 
4 3 2 4 
4 2 2 4 
4 4 3 4 
6 1 1 6 
4 3 3 4 
4 4 7 4 
3 4 3 3 
5 4 4 3 
3 4 5 3 
5 7 1 7 
1 2 3 5 
3 4 6 3 
1 2 2 3 
3 4 4 4 
4 2 3 3 
4 3 3 3 
4 4 3 5 
4 3 3 3 
5 7 6 3 






























































0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 2 2 
0 0 2 3 
1 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 2 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 2 
2 1 2 1 
0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 2 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 
0 0 1 2 
1 0 0 3 
2 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 2 
0 0 3 0 
III. Familiar-Distractor 
2 3 1 2 
0 1 0 0 
2 1 0 0 
1 1 1 1 
2 1 2 0 
2 1 2 0 
0 0 0 1 
0 2 1 2 
1 2 1 3 
2 1 0 4 
0 0 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 2 
1 1 0 2 
1 3 3 2 
1 1 0 0 
2 2 1 1 
0 1 0 0 
1 1 2 1 
1 1 0 1 
1 1 2 1 
0 3 1 2 
0 1 0 1 
0 3 0 2 
0 5 0 2 
0 1 1 1 
0 1 0 1 
1 1 2 2 
0 3 2 2 
3 5 0 2 
2 3 1 3 
3 4 2 3 
3 2 1 1 
1 2 1 1 
1 6 3 1 
4 2 4 0 
3 0 1 3 
5 4 3 3 
2 3 3 0 
3 4 3 4 
2 2 1 0 
3 4 2 2 
3 4 2 1 
1 2 0 1 
2 2 3 2 
1 2 2 1 
2 4 3 2 
2 3 2 0 
3 5 0 0 
2 2 1 2 
3 6 1 0 
2 3 3 0 
2 2 1 0 
0 3 2 3 
4 1 2 2 
0 3 2 2 
0 3 1 1 
3 0 2 2 
0 5 2 4 
10 8 8 4 
5 5 6 3 
5 4 3 4 
3 1 4 2 
4 2 2 1 
2 3 2 1 
3 3 2 1 
2 3 3 3 
2 4 2 4 
2 4 3 1 
3 5 5 6 
3 3 1 1 
3 5 5 3 
2 1 4 1 
2 1 2 2 
1 3 3 2 
2 2 1 2 
3 1 1 3 
5 1 2 3 
5 2 2 2 
1 2 1 2 
5 2 2 2 
3 2 2 2 
1 1 2 1 
2 2 3 3 
6 1 6 4 
3 4 2 2 
1 2 4 4 
2 3 3 0 
2 5 3 3 
6 410 3 
6 4 0 6 
3 2 0 3 
2 5 0 4 
3 2 2 1 
3 4 4 3 
3 1 3 0 
3 1 2 3 
6 5 3 1 
1 4 2 1 
6 4 6 5 
1 1 2 2 
5 4 2 5 
3 3 1 3 
2 0 1 3 
2 4 4 3 
2 0 1 1 
4 1 1 3 
1 4 3 2 
4 3 4 2 
2 3 2 3 
4 6 3 3 
2 1 3 3 
3 1 1 1 
2 3 3 3 
5 2 4 3 
3 1 3 1 
3 2 2 2 
1 4 4 2 
4 3 4 3 






























































0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 2 2 0 
1 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 2 
0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 3 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
IV. Unfamiliar-Frequency 
1 4 1 1 
2 3 1 0 
2 2 2 2 
1 4 1 1 
1 2 0 1 
3 2 1 1 
1 3 1 1 
2 2 1 2 
1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 
4 1 0 1 
3 1 1 2 
3 2 2 0 
3 1 1 2 
3 3 2 2 
2 1 0 5 
4 5 1 0 
3 6 0 0 
2 3 1 1 
3 3 1 0 
2 3 1 1 
2 2 1 2 
2 3 1 1 
1 4 1 0 
0 2 1 1 
1 1 1 0 
0 2 2 1 
2 2 2 5 
0 2 1 4 
1 1 1 1 
5 2 311 
1 3 3 3 
3 4 4 4 
2 3 1 4 
2 1 2 2 
1 3 3 1 
1 2 3 1 
4 3 3 5 
3 3 2 2 
2 3 2 2 
1 1 3 2 
1 0 1 1 
2 3 3 2 
4 5 3 4 
3 4 5 2 
6 5 7 0 
2 7 5 3 
4 8 6 3 
4 210 0 
5 4 5 3 
2 2 2 0 
4 2 3 1 
4 3 2 1 
1 1 4 1 
4 3 5 2 
3 2 2 1 
2 3 5 2 
5 1 7 2 
5 3 4 0 
3 2 2 0 
810 7 2 
5 4 3 1 
4 4 3 3 
3 4 4 2 
4 4 5 1 
4 3 3 3 
4 4 6 3 
5 2 4 2 
2 2 3 3 
5 3 4 4 
2 0 2 2 
2 3 2 1 
4 3 4 2 
6 3 8 1 
1 3 4 2 
6 4 5 8 
10 9 4 6 
610 5 4 
610 6 9 
4 6 5 3 
4 3 3 3 
5 3 1 3 
4 4 2 4 
4 4 4 4 
2 3 3 2 
2 3 2 2 
3 3 2 3 
10 5 6 5 
6 3 2 4 
2 3 1 3 
413 510 
4 6 2 3 
5 5 3 3 
5 4 5 6 
3 3 3 5 
5 4 2 2 
4 5 3 5 
6 5 2 6 
3 4 3 4 
4 5 2 3 
1 1 0 2 
2 1 0 3 
5 3 2 2 
5 5 7 5 
5 3 4 3 
4 4 7 2 
6 8 3 3 
4 9 5 7 
12 5 8 1 
6 4 6 4 
4 3 2 2 
3 2 4 1 
2 2 1 2 
4 4 4 4 
3 3 4 2 
4 3 4 3 
5 4 3 3 
3 4 6 5 
4 6 4 1 






























































2 0 2 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 2 
2 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 
1 0 0 0 
6 0 4 0 
1 1 2 3 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 
2 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 5 
0 1 0 2 
V. Unfamiliar-Memory Test 
3 3 1 1 
3 3 1 3 
4 1 1 3 
3 3 1 2 
3 5 1 2 
4 3 1 2 
2 3 2 3 
1 1 1 1 
4 3 2 0 
1 3 0 3 
2 3 1 1 
2 2 1 1 
3 2 2 1 
1 2 3 1 
1 2 2 3 
1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 0 
1 2 1 0 
1 2 1 5 
2 0 1 5 
2 3 1 0 
3 2 1 2 
1 0 1 6 
3 3 1 2 
1 1 0 3 
3 1 1 3 
0 3 1 1 
5 3 1 0 
0 1 1 3 
3 4 0 7 
3 2 3 2 
2 4 2 2 
6 3 4 1 
1 4 3 2 
5 4 5 3 
3 4 3 4 
3 4 2 4 
2 2 2 2 
0 5 6 3 
4 5 2 3 
4 4 5 4 
1 2 4 2 
1 3 4 4 
5 4 3 2 
2 6 7 2 
4 3 4 2 
3 3 4 1 
4 3 4 2 
3 1 4 2 
1 3 4 3 
0 4 4 2 
4 3 3 1 
6 6 4 4 
2 3 4 1 
1 0 1 0 
3 3 6 2 
4 2 3 3 
5 3 5 3 
0 4 3 1 
2 5 5 1 
4 3 2 3 
5 3 4 2 
7 4 5 2 
6 3 4 2 
7 4 4 3 
3 4 4 2 
7 4 5 4 
3 4 2 3 
6 4 4 4 
5 4 4 4 
6 6 4 2 
2 4 3 2 
4 4 4 4 
6 4 4 6 
5 7 4 4 
5 2 5 3 
4 5 1 6 
6 5 4 4 
5 5 3 5 
6 5 4 3 
6 5 3 4 
8 5 3 4 
4 5 3 3 
6 7 2 4 
4 2 1 2 
7 5 4 4 
4 5 4 5 
8 4 5 3 
3 5 1 3 
6 4 2 6 
3 3 0 3 
6 4 1 5 
5 7 2 6 
4 7 3 4 
5 6 5 5 
2 5 4 5 
3 3 4 3 
4 3 2 4 
3 6 5 6 
5 3 1 5 
4 6 5 6 
3 2 2 3 
5 3 2 3 
7 5 6 6 
8 6 5 4 
4 2 4 3 
6 4 4 2 
8 3 2 0 
7 3 3 5 
8 6 7 5 
8 3 4 3 
6 5 4 3 
7 5 6 3 
6 4 3 2 
3 2 1 1 
3 4 4 3 
5 4 3 2 
5 6 4 4 
5 3 3 2 






























































0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
2 0 1 4 
3 1 2 2 
0 0 0 0 
5 0 010 
5 0 4 2 
0 0 1 4 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 3 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 3 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
VI. Unfamiliar-Distractor 
0 0 1 0 
0 5 1 3 
0 0 0 0 
2 1 0 2 
6 5 0 1 
0 2 2 2 
4 4 6 4 
1 4 3 0 
0 4 0 2 
5 0 1 2 
1 0 0 0 
1 2 0 1 
0 2 0 0 
4 3 2 3 
0 0 1 0 
6 6 6 0 
3 1 2 4 
2 0 2 2 
2 4 2 2 
1 2 1 0 
4 2 2 2 
3 2 0 0 
3 3 0 0 
0 0 2 3 
3 4 0 1 
0 3 3 0 
0 0 1 0 
2 1 3 0 
0 5 0 0 
0 1 1 3 
3 3 2 0 
4 4 5 2 
3 3 3 0 
1 3 2 0 
4 5 2 3 
3 1 2 2 
5 6 8 5 
5 3 4 1 
5 6 4 0 
5 7 3 0 
2 5 4 0 
0 2 3 2 
2 3 6 2 
4 2 3 2 
2 0 2 0 
8 5 8 4 
4 3 5 4 
0 3 6 3 
1 5 1 1 
3 2 2 1 
4 4 4 4 
1 2 3 0 
0 3 0 2 
0 3 0 3 
4 2 3 3 
310 6 3 
4 3 2 0 
2 0 2 2 
1 2 3 0 
2 2 4 2 
4 2 3 3 
5 3 4 3 
3 3 3 3 
3 3 3 1 
5 6 3 5 
3 2 2 1 
8 3 5 5 
4 1 1 5 
6 7 3 6 
6 6 5 4 
4 5 4 2 
3 3 3 2 
4 6 0 2 
3 3 2 3 
6 2 0 3 
1010 610 
8 7 5 3 
5 2 3 6 
3 3 3 4 
4 2 1 4 
4 3 4 4 
4 2 3 0 
3 3 3 1 
4 4 2 4 
2 3 4 2 
6 0 6 3 
4 2 2 3 
3 3 1 3 
5 5 0 5 
4 4 2 4 
4 3 1 4 
6 5 3 6 
3 3 3 0 
5 4 3 4 
8 4 6 5 
3 1 3 3 
10 7 6 3 
6 5 2 3 
5 7 4 5 
10 9 5 2 
3 2 0 3 
3 4 2 3 
2 4 2 1 
3 3 3 2 
3 3 2 4 
10 5 6 6 
5 6 4 3 
2 3 2 4 
3 5 4 5 
4 1 2 0 
4 3 4 3 
3 2 1 2 
3 0 0 0 
5 5 0 5 
5 2 2 2 
1010 310 
3 0 3 5 
2 2 2 1 
5 5 3 3 
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